#github-actions

The malicious release carried valid SLSA provenance and passed every integrity check, because the honest build pipeline compiled source that was already poisoned. It also ran when a developer merely opened the folder.

A credential left in a Docker image layer let an unidentified attacker rewrite Codecov's Bash Uploader and harvest every secret from its customers' CI environments for sixty days. No one was ever identified.

Attackers compromised a GitHub Personal Access Token belonging to the `tj-actions-bot`, retroactively rewriting version tags v1–v45.0.7 of the widely-used `tj-actions/changed-files` Action to point to a malicious commit. The payload scanned runner memory for secrets and printed them directly into public workflow logs, exposing CI/CD credentials across 23,000+ repositories. Tracked as CVE-2025-30066; linked to an earlier compromise of `reviewdog/action-setup@v1` (CVE-2025-30154).