#backdoor
5 cases
A copy of Postmark's MCP server, published to npm by someone unaffiliated with them, worked perfectly for fifteen versions. The sixteenth added one line — a BCC to an address the publisher controlled.
Excerpt For 33 hours an attacker rerouted the addresses Softaculous updates come from, obtained a genuine TLS certificate for the diverted domains, and served a malicious Virtualizor update that nothing in the chain was able to reject.
A stranger emailed an unpaid maintainer offering to take over a package he no longer used. Three months later it was stealing private keys from bitcoin wallets holding more than 100 BTC. Nobody was ever identified.
A North Korean-linked actor compromised Trading Technologies' X_TRADER, used it to breach 3CX, and shipped signed, trojanised VoIP clients to its customers — the first documented case of one software supply chain attack causing another.
A sophisticated multi-year supply chain attack compromised the widely used xz compression library, embedding a backdoor in liblzma that targeted OpenSSH authentication on systemd-based Linux distributions. The attacker, operating under the persona 'Jia Tan,' spent over two years building trust as a contributor before gaining maintainership and inserting the malicious code.